Duka Zólyomi Árpád

Dear Georgian friends, dear colleagues,

the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia of August 2008 is generally interpreted as a hard failure of the involved parties to settle the “frozen” conflict over Abkhazia and South-Ossetia by peaceful means. Now, the international public opinion is trying to appoint those responsible for the escalation of the conflict. Do we really have the chance to find the originators of the sad events in last August? I think, if anybody had any doubts during or shortly after the conflict, by now there have appeared a couple of facts, which reveal us the pure intentions of the involved parties, already not covered by the beneficiant curtain of the diplomatic language.

Lets have a look at the facts: on August 12, Russian President Medvedev said he had ordered an end to military operations “the operation has achieved its goal, security for peacekeepers and civilians has been restored.” Subsequently the thanks to the mediation by EU chairman, Nicolas Sarkozy, the parties finally reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement on August 12, signed by Georgia and Russia on August 15 in Tbilisi and on August 16 in Moscow. Mr. Kokoity and Mr. Bagapsh joined agreement some days later. Except of the fact, that the hostilities did not immediately stop - the Russian forces still advanced -, the international opinion, among them the EU, followed with worries, that the idea of the return of the refugees to their homes - as the EU-chairman suggested -  was explicitly refused by the Russian side.

The fifth point of the signed cease-fire agreement however gave hope for those who still beleived in the so much time declared Russian intention to respect Georgia’s territorial integrity. The fifth point says: “The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must withdraw to the line where they were stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities.” Now, in February 2009 we see, this commitment of the Russian side is utterly neglected, and there are no signs of the will to fulfill this particular obligation, since On 17 September 2008 Russia signed with Tskhinvali and Sukhumi cooperation agreements that provide for the establishment of Russian military bases in both regions and authorize Russian troops to patrol their respective borders with Georgia. Russia plans to establish a Black Sea naval base in Abkhazia and intends to restore the former Soviet airbase in Bombora, Abkhazia. The deployment of Russian naval, air, and land power, including some 3,700 troops in Abkhazia would pose new security threats to Georgia’s sovereignty, and would be a clear breach of the cease-fire agreement. Pre-existing international agreements allow Russia to deploy a peacekeeping battalion of around 500 troops in South Ossetia and about 2,500 Russians in three peacekeeping battalions and one airborne battalion in Abkhazia.

If I speak about the peace-keepers, I can not leave without word the future of the unarmed OSCE peace-keepers, earlier completing their mission  in South-Ossetia and compelled to be withdrawn from the area during the armed conflict. Russia says the OSCE monitors should remain outside South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and it had already blocked extension of OSCE mission’s mandate, when Mr Lavrov stated: ” it is now up to “independent and sovereign” South Ossetia to decide whether to let the OSCE monitors redeploy… no longer will issues concerning South Ossetia be discussed at the OSCE in the absence of Tskhinvali’s representatives” . Russia wants to block the continuation of a successful international peace keeping by referring to a subject which is not recognized by the international community, except of Russia and Nicaragua.

It is more than probable that Russia will try to prevent the extension of UN observers’ presence in Georgia as well, and push for having separate  UN Mission, not linked with the UNOMIG.

This problems have been followed by the representatives of the EU during the Geneva-talks. Now, after the third round of the talks, it seems, however, that these talks can go on only in operational level, in the level of incident prevention and management to ensure minimum security standards for the everyday life of the population in the living in the concerned areas. Off course this is very important step forward that gives us hope for further improvement, post-war settlement. Paralelly to our disappointment, that Russia does not want to lead negotiations on the substance of  problems - territorial integrity of Georgia, peace-keeping missions -  we welcome the fact, that finally all sides recognized the necessity of allowing to return of displaced people in conditions of security and dignity.

As far as the humanitarian consequences of the conflict are concerned, there are more then thirty thousand refugees and IDPs after the war, who significantly increased the number of the IDP-mass from the beginning of ninetees, and - similarly to them - they have no perspective to return to their homes in short time.

The situation that occured during and after the armed conflict in last August could be   described as “a humanitarian disaster”, since more than a half of the population fled in South Ossetia, a lots of people were forced to leave their homes in the Russian-controlled “buffer-zone”, the region of Gori and finally the Kodori Gorge-valley.

After the visit of Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Thomas Hammarberg in the region last November and subsequently to the CoE’s report on the IDPs in Georgia, we have a rather sharp picture about the situation in this regard.

By the beginning of the winter almost onehundred-thousand people have returned to their homes, this is approximately eighty-five percent of the total number of the IDP affected by the August-conflict. The main problem of the IDP who have no possibility to return is that they are compelled to live in conditions that hardly can be compatible with the human dignity. We are aware, the war is phenomenon that is accompanied with a “necessary” amount of suffer, but we have to be aware of the fact, the displaced civilian population is the most vulnerable part of the society affected by war, and for this reason they need special treatment. No functioning heating system in the Tbilisi centre for IDPs, potentially dangerous environment for the physical safety of the war victims, lack of baby food, lacking hygiene facilities and lacking grant of IDP-status in order to ensure to basic civic and material conditions for surviving are the things, that should have primary significance for the Georgian government which has received a substantial international assistance to ensure better conditions for them.  The government’s Action Plan for the IDPs should be implemented as soon as possible in order its commitment to find a durable solution for the IDPs by 2011, both the 37 500 IDPs from 2008 and the mass of 223 000 IDP from the beginning of the nineties. On the other hand we must remark, the efforts of the government to provide at least a part of the IDPs with new homes in the Gori-region - four thousand cottages are being built and more than one-thousand-five-hundred homes are repaired - are steps which can ease the suffering of the victims.

Certain part of the current IDP tried to return to their homes, but they were forced to leave again with direct or indirect means. Such reports are being received from the regions of Perevi and Akhalgori. Those who remained in spite of the unstable security circumstances would - off course - welcome Georgian police and EUMM presence parallel to the South-Ossetian Militia stationing. We all know, at the current stage of talks it is hardly possible, but the safeguarding of the citizens personal safety is worth of compromises and in the course of the further negotiations this should be a priority.